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EdinLR Vol 15 pp 423-427
Tackling Sectarianism Through the Criminal Law
The Scottish Government is (at the time of writing) piloting through the Scottish
Parliament the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications
(Scotland) Bill. Its target is in effect sectarianism. Whatever form any new statute will
take, the burden will remain with the justice system to decide what sectarianism is.
That task will of course fall on the overworked fiscals and the lower courts. Given the
recent decision by Sheriff Scott regarding a prosecution which linked an anti-Israel
protest with racism, where he described the Crown’s attempt “to squeeze malice and
ill-will out of the agreed facts” as “rather strained”,1 Crown Office will surely find this
unwelcome.
The higher criminal courts stubbornly buck responsibility for defining either
religious or racial prejudice. In Walls v Brown, Lord Carloway observed only that
there could not be “any reasonable comparison” between the Famine Song, God Save
the Queen and Flower of Scotland because the Famine Song “call[s] upon people
native to Scotland to leave the country because of their racial origins”.2 In Dyer v
Hutchison the offender directed anti-English abuse against Rangers supporters. It
was decided that his conduct “may not have been racist in the same way” as that of the
two other appellants, who made monkey grunts and yelled “you dirty black bastard”.3
It is understandable in such an embattled and politicised area of law that both drafters
and judges have been tempted to provide as little definition as they humanly can. On
the other hand, the Scottish appeal courts have rather taken the biscuit.
What would adequately define Scottish sectarianism? Academics agree on one
thing: it is not predominantly “about religion”. Arguments then begin about what
else it is a proxy for (racism; tribalism; the hidden injuries of class) and how deep
it runs (history; life chances; demography). What women contribute, research has
not noticed. Perhaps, some say, it might be deemed ethno-religious. But, however
plausible that might be as regards some “Protestant” offenders, can we really foist an
1 Procurator Fiscal (Edinburgh) v Napier and others, Edinburgh Sheriff Court, Sheriff’s Note issued
8 Apr 2010. See “Israel protest at concert ‘was not racist’ ”, BBC News Online 8 Apr 2010.
2 Walls v Brown [2009] HCJAC 59, 2009 JC 375 at para 19.
3 Dyer v Hutchison [2006] HCJAC 45, 2006 JC 212 at paras 27, 5 and 8.
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ethno-religious motivation on “Catholic” offenders?Whatever, what no-one predicted
is this spring’s brutal outbreak of sectarian lawlessness related to football.
A. SECTARIANISM IN MODERN SCOTLAND
It will not help that football chanting has its own unique and subtle symbols
and does not depend exclusively on crude abuse. The courts do not often find
themselves bamboozled by racist thugs wandering through Pollokshields singing
a menacing chant worded, say, “I love being Scottish”. But in football, laudatory
songs – “up the IRA” – are common and must in principle be distinguished from
express prejudice – “up yours, you Fenian bastards”.
The underlying problem for the law, however, is that Scottish sectarianism is not
a unitary phenomenon. Unlike Northern Ireland, Scotland has pockets of football
rivalry where supporters sing and yell sectarian insults, knowing that these are
damaging and are banned, but barely grasping the cultural differences from which
these originate.4 Perhaps the best example of the difference between the two nations
is the recent attempt at a legislative definition of sectarian in Northern Ireland. The
definition of sectarian chanting proposed by the NI Human Rights Commission, and
accepted by the NI Executive, was that “it consists of or includes matter which is
threatening, abusive or insulting to a person by reason of that person’s religious
belief or political opinion or against an individual as a member of such a group”.5
The definition had cross-party support and failed to become law only because it was
opposed by the Ulster Unionist Party.
It is hard to imagine a Scotland today where sectarian belief could be demarcated
by political loyalty. Indeed religious prejudice, it seems, was not read across to include
political taunts in one case where football supporters sang songs about the IRA – even
though a religious aggravation in Scots law can extend even to an offence motivated
by malice and ill-will “against a social or cultural group with a perceived religious
affiliation, based on their membership of that group”.6 Reference to a political
organisation, whatever its meaning in the Northern Irish context, could not by itself
be seen in Scotland to amount to religious prejudice.
Protestant and Catholic Scotland, as Michael Rosie explained in what remains the
best recent work on the topic,7 is a society marked by bigotry but not systematic
discrimination; by clashing identities but not by separate worlds; and by spats but not
warfare.8 People do not vote for Catholicised and Protestanticised political parties.
4 See e.g. C and R Deuchar, “Territorialities in Scotland: perceptions of young people in Glasgow” (2009)
12 Journal of Youth Studies 731 at 740.
5 Northern Ireland Assembly, Official Report, amendment 9, tabled 3 Mar 2011 (emphasis added).
6 Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 s 74. See also “Sheriff right to dismiss case against man singing IRA
songs, says expert”, Scotsman 30 Mar 2011.
7 M Rosie, The Sectarian Myth in Scotland (2004).
8 Compare Northern Ireland: House of Commons Northern Ireland Affairs Committee, The Challenge of
Diversity: Hate Crime in Northern Ireland, Ninth Report of Session 2004-05 (HL 2004-05, 548-I) vol I
para 13.
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Roman Catholics in Scotland today have an even chance of settling down with
someone outside their own religion.9 As an audience member at a recent Edinburgh
University evening debate asked, why are we treating football as the symptom and
not the disease?
What is notable about the recent horrific history of assaults and bullets and bombs
by post is that it is so atypical. The most vulnerable victims in Scotland are the visible
ethnic minorities, who continue to live in greater poverty, with all the disadvantage
that entails, and whose experience of criminal victimisation miserably overshadows
the anti-Catholic experience. Charges with a racial aggravation amount to over 4000 a
year, with the great majority of victims identified as coming from the tiny proportion
of these groups in Scottish society.10 Interviews in 2004 with 175 people who had
reported racist incidents in the Strathclyde region found that more than a third
described enduring such incidents so frequently, even constantly, that they could not
quantify the number involved. The majority experienced this abuse from different
perpetrators, rather than repeat victimisation from a single source.11
Rosie and other social theorists have had insufficient to say, though, about the
justified apprehension felt by a person who fears they may be identified with the
Roman Catholic minority. There were 693 charges with a religious aggravation in
the most recent annual figures released,12 and it is unlikely to be a mere artifice of
reporting and recording practices that the chances of “Roman Catholicism” being the
target were (on the last occasion that the count was made public) around twice that of
“Protestantism”.13 Meanwhile, much of the public debate about separate education
seems unable to refrain from openly hostile victim-blaming based on no credible
evidence.
The problem is not confined to football. There is anti-Catholicism and anti-
Irish feeling in Scotland, albeit that we struggle even to estimate its prevalence. In
particular it is wrong to imply by omission that the hostility is the same on both
sides. Chants of “Prod” or “Hun” and a few breach of the peace convictions do not
amount to equivalence. Scots law, however, could not successfully distinguish the two
phenomena without incurring huge criticism: recognising the differences would thus
inevitably be left to the fiscals and the courts.
9 Currently the best source is C Holligan and G Raab, Inter-Sectarian Couples in the 2001 Census
(Scottish Longitudinal Study Research Working Paper 7, 2010) para 12. Note this is less “inter” mixing
than a random assortation would create, a point most commentators omit to mention.
10 Scottish Government, Statistical Bulletin: Racist Incidents Recorded by the Police in Scotland,
2009-10 (2011) table 8. 2% of the population in the last census identified as “other white” and
2.5% placed themselves in the remaining minority categories: see Office of the Chief Statistician,
Analysis of Ethnicity in the 2001 Census – Summary Report (2004). The proportion will have grown
since.
11 K Goodall, R Choudri, R Barbour and S Hilton, The Policing of Racist Incidents in Strathclyde (2004)
10.
12 Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service, “Hate crime in Scotland 2010-11” (nd), available at
http://www.copfs.gov.uk/sites/default/files/Hate Crime-publication-final version.pdf.
13 K Doyle, Use of Section 74 of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 –Religiously Aggravated
Reported Crime: An 18 Month Review (2006) para 3.2.
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B. A CRIMINAL SOLUTION?
So it is in the midst of all this that the SNP government introduced its new Bill.
As weary practitioners and law lecturers revising their notes will be asking, is it
necessary? Would it work?
The Bill, it seems, sets out largely to mortar cracks and create nominate offences.14
The cracks are few and there is (for the most part) ample law to cover disorderly or
threatening behaviour. Explicit naming of football offences appeals to many, though,
and a true gap exists in the arena of incitement to religious hatred, because it is an
insult to victims to subsume this under religiously aggravated breach of the peace.
Defining these is a delicate job to take on. The Bill as introduced was far too flawed
in either concept or construction to be fit for it. Much amending will be needed, but
this could be done.
The other question however is whether new provisions will work. It has long
been argued by criminologists that longer sentences do not deter crime and that
policymakers do not want to know this.15 Governments, however, must be seen to
be responsive, and there are benefits to be gained from instantiating longer sentence
maxima and creating new, named offences. Each time sentence enhancement
provisions have been introduced in the UK, they have been marketed, sometimes
primarily, as messages sent to the general public and the victims: an expressivist
approach. They are sold, too, as a means of bringing about changed behaviours. One
important function they also carry out is to measure and monitor offences where
an aggravation has been proven. It is easily forgotten that before the introduction
of police monitoring of racist incidents in Scotland, commentators were fond of
announcing that Scots were too busy being sectarian to engage in something as un-
Scottish as racism.16 Records of convictions which include statutory aggravations
provide further evidence not just that racially aggravated behaviour is alleged, but
that it has occurred.
Nonetheless, more new legislation seems at first sight an expensive and
bureaucratic way to prove there is a problem. The question therefore is whether
a denunciatory message has value and whether new legislation might change these
presumed sectarian behaviours. Again, orthodoxy claims not, but Phyllis Gerstenfeld
has cited behavioural studies research which concludes that law can influence people
to reduce overt prejudice, and that it is possible - indeed such an approach is relatively
effective – to change attitudes through changing their behaviour.17
The old chestnut that the solution is education, education, education need not
be wholly rejected, but Gerstenfeld elsewhere suggests that when a “hate” crime
is carried out in search of a thrill, to gain excitement and social capital, a policy
of tackling bigotry in society may not be all that productive.18 Notably, of the
14 See para 11 of the Explanatory Notes to the Bill.
15 See especially the special issue (10(1), February 2011) of Criminology and Public Policy.
16 See e.g. P Dimeo and G Finn, “Scottish Racism, Scottish Identities”, in P Brown (ed), Fanatics! Power,
Identity, and Fandom in Football (1998).
17 P B Gerstenfeld, Hate Crimes: Causes, Controls, and Controversies, 2nd edn (2011) 209.
18 Ibid 279.
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cases examined in Doyle’s review of the operation of section 74, 95% of the
convictions were for breach of the peace. Over half were specifically recorded as
involving alcohol. In 34% of the cases the target was the police, and in 45% the
target was the community, suggesting disorderly conduct. Only 17% of targets were
“civilians” (neither police officers nor workers in the leisure industry, transport or
hospitals).19
Furthermore, it seems that the public may be more likely to hold favourable
views of the criminal justice system when they are more informed about patterns of
sentencing.20 Even just a public discussion which provides more information about
sentencing may prove useful. It matters that the public feel positive toward the
criminal justice system; not least because it is they who report crimes and support
the prosecution process throughout.21 All in all, the evidence is far from conclusive,
but we should give new measures a considered hearing.
Kay Goodall
University of Stirling
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The Carloway Review: An Opportunity Lost
The decision of the UK Supreme Court in Cadder v HMAdvocate1 shook the Scottish
legal establishment with its declaration that Scots law failed to provide full and fair
protections for persons held in police custody. Reactions to Cadder vary from an
acceptance that it unmasked a serious fallibility in Scottish procedural practice,2 to
a belief that it was an ill-informed rejection of Scotland’s intricate net of safeguards
that had hitherto been thought sufficient to satisfy the demands of article 6 of the
ECHR.3
Following Cadder, the Justice Secretary, Kenny MacAskill, appointed Lord
Carloway to undertake a review of the law and practice of detaining and questioning
suspects in a criminal investigation in Scotland.4 There have been many appeals
19 Doyle, Religiously Aggravated Crime (n 13) para 3.16.
20 J M Gay, “What shapes public opinion of the CJS?” in J Woods and T Gannon (eds), Public Opinion
and Criminal Justice (2009) 49 at 65;
21 G Tendayi Viki and Gerd Bohner, “Achieving accurate assessment of the attitudes toward the CJS:
methodological issues”, in Woods and Gannon (eds), Public Opinion (n 20) 96.
1 [2010] UKSC 43, 2010 SLT 1125.
2 J Scott, “Detention without access to a lawyer ends in Scotland”, The Guardian, 27 Oct 2010, available
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2010/oct/27/detention-without-access-lawyer-scotland-ends
3 J McCluskey, “Supreme error” (2011) 15 EdinLR 276
4 See Carloway Review, Consultation Document (2011), available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/About/
CarlowayReview.
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involving Scottish rules of evidence and procedure since devolution and the
enactment of the Human Rights Act in 1998. What sets Cadder apart are the
wider repercussions of the specific finding in the Supreme Court’s conclusion that a
detained person in police custody is entitled to legal advice before facing an interview.
The previous arrangement whereby such persons only had the right to have a solicitor
notified of their detention, with the right to a consultation with a solicitor deferred
until arrest, was deemed in Cadder to be a contravention of article 6.
This short paper provides an overview of the remit of the Carloway Review
(henceforth the Review) and some suggestions about the future implications of its
deliberations. Although one focus of the Review is to examine whether the emergency
legislation requires amendment, it is accepted that Cadder raises far more issues than
the point at which entitlement to legal advice arises. The more complex challenge for
the Review lies in its response to these broader issues since they strike directly at
long-standing assumptions about the Scottish fair trial.
The Supreme Court insisted that Salduz v Turkey5 had effectively established a
new rule. The justices were unmoved by the reasoning in the full bench decision
in HM Advocate v McLean6 that overall Scots law met the requirements for a fair
trial. The result was not only that Scotland’s arrangements for questioning suspects
and detainees were ruled out of step with article 6(3)(c), but that these deficiencies
could not be assuaged by the existence of other procedural safeguards. The decision
therefore generates a whole host of questions beyond the immediate one concerning
that appeal. The so-called “Sons of Cadder” cases due to be adjudicated by the
Supreme Court later this year may resolve some of these questions, but they may
also throw up further criticisms of Scots law and for that reason the Review cannot
avoid an expansive and flexible remit.
A. THE CONSULTATION
In his foreword to the Review’s consultation document, Lord Carloway seizes this
opportunity to re-visit the whole framework of safeguards that underpin the fair
trial:7
I am keen that this Review should be more than an attempt merely to adjust or tweak any
perceived flaws in the legislation. It should take the opportunity to re-examine the core
principles underlying the procedures of detention, police questioning, charge and arrest,
and the implications for concepts such as corroboration and the inference from silence.
This will then inform recommendations for changes to the criminal justice system that will
enhance its operation as a whole, in a way that properly and fully meets the requirement to
protect the rights of victims and suspects.
5 (2009) 49 EHRR 421.
6 [2009] HCJAC 97, 2010 SLT 73.
7 Carloway Review, Consultation Document (n 4) 3. “The legislation” is the Criminal Procedure (Legal
Assistance, Detention and Appeals) (Scotland) Act 2010, the emergency legislation enacted in the
aftermath of the Cadder judgment.
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This is a bold and ambitious agenda. While the sentiment is admirable there must
be real doubts about whether it can be achieved. The Review timetable permitted a
consultation period of eight weeks. It is difficult to see how complex matters such as
“the implications for concepts such as corroboration and the inference from silence”
can be fully explored in the proposed condensed schedule. Although Lord Carloway
has held a number of open Roadshows, the reality of such a tight timespan is that
attendance is from a relatively small set of professional groups with the freedom
and motivation to engage. Broader public debate is necessarily limited and much
reflective argument vital to the law reform process may never emerge or only be
aired at the legislative stage.8
The Review groups its enquiry around three main components: custody, evidence
and appeals. It poses far-reaching questions for a post-Cadder environment, most of
which can be loosely characterised as “does this existing rule or practice continue to
serve a useful purpose”? For example, the Review invites readers to reflect upon such
diverse and consequential possibilities as whether the exclusionary rules should be in
statutory form, whether the corroboration rule should be abolished, whether there
is still a need for the police charge, or for retaining a distinction between detention
and arrest, and whether police questioning should be permitted at any point between
charge and trial.9
One obvious concern must be how far the debates and arguments generated by
the Review foreshadow a new dawn. Cadder’s impact has been described by Lord
Carloway as one that “overturned Scottish jurisprudence”.10 One cannot create a new
jurisprudence overnight nor should one try to do so. The challenge is to construct
a comprehensive and coherent response that absorbs the upheaval. That in turn
requires time for a full and reflective consideration of the whole body of rules of
evidence and procedure. If a piecemeal approach to reform is followed, there is a
real danger of caveats, exceptions and unforeseen complications emerging, with the
likelihood of the whole issue having to be re-visited in the next few years.
As an exercise in how to conduct law reform, the Review is far from ideal. For
example, take the treatment of corroboration, a rule which is also currently subject
to scrutiny by the Scottish Law Commission, the body officially charged with law
reform, in their current project on similar fact evidence and the Moorov doctrine.
Their recommendations on corroboration will need careful integration with those of
Lord Carloway. In regard to corroboration the terms of reference for the Review
require it to:11
. . . consider the criminal law of evidence, insofar as there are implications arising from
[legal advice prior to and during police questioning] in particular the requirement for
corroboration and the suspect’s right to silence.
8 Lord Carloway’s remit is “to prepare recommendations for legislative change and new guidance”:
Carloway Review, Consultation Document (n 4) para 1.
9 Ibid 35.
10 Ibid 3.
11 Ibid 9.
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These last two requirements are addressed by the Review as:12
Sufficiency of evidence (including corroboration) covering the thresholds of evidence
required for charge, prosecution, determination of “no case to answer” and conviction [and
o]ther “safeguards” for a fair trial, such as a prohibition on inferences drawn from a suspect’s
silence at interview.
The Review notes that “it wishes to examine the practical value of these evidential
rules in and of themselves” and not consider them “solely or even primarily in
terms of “re-balancing” the system”.13 Nonetheless, a re-balancing may be precisely
what some politicians and policy-makers have in mind. The effect of Cadder is to
close off one major opportunity for the police to gather evidence from suspects.
Police investigations are inevitably impeded to some extent. The consequent focus
on corroboration and adverse inferences cannot fail but to give the impression of a
quid pro quo. Lord Carloway is frank about the import of all this: “[t]he proposition
is simply that Scots law is out of date and out of kilter with all European and common
law systems”.14
B. ANALYSIS
There can be no doubt that what is contemplated in this Review is the possibility of
the dilution or even abolition of the rule of corroboration. This is a debate that has
been in the wings for some years, though largely confined to sexual offences and other
cases where corroboration is notoriously hard to find. The abolition of corroboration
has been advanced by a range of senior figures within the criminal justice system
including the current and most recent Lord Advocate and ACPOS representatives.15
However, to abolish corroboration in rape cases needs a sound theoretical basis to
avoid the criticism that it is an expedient to deal with embarrassingly high attrition
rates. Arguably, removing the corroboration rule simply diverts attention away
from tackling other potentially more effective responses to the structural problems
associated with rape prosecutions. It could even be counter-productive by placing
greater scrutiny on a complainer’s credibility and reliability. None of these arguments
are raised in the Review.
Lord Carloway acknowledges corroboration is a tenet of “cornerstone” status in
the criminal justice system. If he recommends its removal in all or some cases, that
will constitute an astonishingly radical proposal. For many people corroboration is
an article of faith to be defended at all costs. Others may adopt a more pragmatic
attitude. Nonetheless, corroboration is central to the body of rules of evidence.
The potential harm to the integrity of the whole if there is reform of selected
individual rules lies as much in a perception that insufficient time has been devoted
12 Ibid 10-11.
13 Para 3.
14 Para 12.
15 G Rose, “Police leader attacks evidence controls”, The Scotsman 29 Jun 2010.
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to public debate of the consequences of abolition as in the substance of the eventual
recommendations.
From another perspective there is the interesting question of whether abolishing
corroboration will make any practical difference. Proponents of that position
argue that it will neither change the rule on sufficiency of evidence nor the
prosecutor’s obligation to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. Prosecutors will
still require sufficient evidence to prosecute, and courts will still require sufficient
evidence to convict. Roberts and Zuckerman, leading English commentators, have
observed:16
Abolishing the law of corroboration no more dispenses with epistemic standards for
assessing evidence support than abolishing the law of hearsay would cure the inherent
infirmities of second-hand evidence.
If Roberts and Zuckerman are right, changes to corroboration or adverse inferences
may not effect the re-balancing some desire and others fear. Even if it appears to
ease the path to sufficiency, it can be predicted it will also create new contested areas
concerning admissibility. For example, if legal advice is given at an earlier stage in
detention then the fairness of the admissibility of a suspect’s answers will have to be
judged in light of the fairness of the quality of information supplied by the police to
the solicitor. If police questioning is permitted after arrest then different arguments
over the fairness of evidence derived at that stage will arise. Claims of defective
representation may take on a new dimension –with convicted clients complaining
their solicitor made strategic errors and gave flawed advice as to the level of co-
operation that a client should offer. Depending upon how any permitted waiver of
rights to legal advice is formulated, the assessment of whether a vulnerable suspect
was in fact capable of such a decision may be contested at a later stage.
New legislation can change the existing law but legal culture and practice is often
much slower to respond, especially where there has been trenchant resistance to
the changes and where there is substantial discretion in how the changes can be
interpreted.17 It will be impossible for Lord Carloway’s recommendations to satisfy
all sides of the debate given the polarised nature of the arguments. The consultation
period has at times been overshadowed by rather ill-tempered arguments about the
constitutional role of the UK Supreme Court in regard to Scots criminal law. That,
along with the curtailed scope of the substance of the consultation, denies Scotland
the much wider examination of procedural and evidential rules that a modern
criminal justice system deserves. Until such an exercise is undertaken, Scottish law
and practice will inevitably face further Convention challenges.
Fiona E Raitt
University of Dundee
16 P Roberts and A Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence, 2nd edn (2010) 663.
17 A. Karmen, Crime Victims: An Introduction to Victimology, 2nd edn (1990).
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Much Ado About Justice
A. GARDE À VUE
In France, as elsewhere, a person suspected of an act that may incriminate him
penally may be held by the police and interrogated, before actually being prosecuted.
We describe this situation as garde à vue, and the duration, conditions and mode
of supervision are among one of the most sensitive issues for human rights in a
modern democracy. All the more at a time when the French public discovered that
the practice was far more frequent than had been realized. In fact the media have
begun to relay the experiences of would be offenders from a middle class who had
never imagined having to remove shoes or even a brassiere to conform to the rules in
such a situation. Some 800,000 people seem to have been held in such fashion. This is
to be explained in two manners: the increasing severity of the penal code itself, which
has multiplied the situations eventually leading to a prison sentence, now garde à vue
may only be prescribed if there is such an eventuality; and the second even more
effective cause is the generalised clampdown on traffic offences.
The government’s plan to review the entire code of criminal procedure did not
necessarily include this preliminary stage of garde à vue. But the proposals met with
an unexpected interest from the public and set a series of political dilemnas for their
authors.
The Minister of Justice believed the only issue was to update rules which had at
any rate been strengthened during the last decade. Conditions for garde à vue were
set as follows. The power to place a person in garde à vue was the responsibility
of the police, but specifically was to be exercised by an officier de police judiciaire.
This means a special entitlement delivered to some officers under the control of the
judiciary.
There could fall under such powers any person susceptible to give information on
the facts eventually leading to an incrimination or on the objects or documents related
to such a case. There could then be retained, for a period not exceeding twenty four
hours, a person against whom there might be plausible reasons to suspect they have
committed an offence. The Procureur de la Republique, who is a magistrate from the
Parquet, is immediately notified. The police may then keep a person in custody for
another twenty four hours, but must be authorised to do so by the Procureur. At the
end of this period, the person is either released without charge, or officially charged
by the Parquet, and the prosecution then follows the set rule in front of the judiciary.
Conditions for garde à vue allow for some precautions. The person is immediately
informed of the charges, and is eventually allowed an interpreter. He or she may ask
for the presence of a lawyer who is allowed thirty minutes in presence of the detainee,
but has no access to the file or documents and may not assist in interrogation. The
same is true in the case of prolongation. However this very short delay, twenty four
hours, does not apply to a series of grave incriminations, where counsel may not be
admitted before forty eight or even seventy two hours.
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B. REFORM
There has always been an underlying controversy about these conditions, and the
delicate balance required between the necessities of the investigation and the rights
of the person. But for the government, in other matters so intent on reform, there
was no urgency here. At least, there would have been no cause for concern, if there
had not been a form of mobilisation of the European Court of Human Rights on the
subject. Not that the French government had at the time been censored specifically,
but some decisions had come rather close. In particular, the Court had ruled that
interrogation carried out in the absence of counsel and without his assistance should
not be held valid as proof.1
This fuelled a rising disquiet in the legal profession about the very strict
constriction of the role of counsel in these situations. When this running complaint
from the lawyers – dissatisfied with the need to be present when called at any time of
day or night, with the impossibility of providing much more than moral support –met
with public disquiet about the frequency of garde à vue, the whole proposal was
turned on its head and the minister had to contemplate some more liberal adjustment
than had been at anytime envisaged.
The argument in favor of a radical, and more liberal change in legislation are well
summed up in an opinion made public before the summer by our National Advisory
Commission on Human Rights. For this body, there was much cause for concern in
the existing situation and in the perspectives tabled for its reform. The difficulty starts
from the fact that garde à vue was initially promoted as a legal framework for some
necessary forms of preliminary detention. It is to be preferred to any informal system
by which the police call a person for interrogation without any set conditions. And
so we can immediately note that human rights champions are up in arms against the
suggestion that a person could voluntarily accept being held for interrogation without
the rules of garde à vue being enforced.
Everybody accepts there has to be a legal regime. But should it become
systematic? Should it become a form of physical punishment? Should it leave the
person alone and practically undefended in the face of his interrogators?
The Commission severely criticized the ever extending practice of garde à vue.
This was due to criteria that were originally too imprecise, or when related to
the nature of a possible incrimination, were bound to follow the tendency to
multiply situations involving penal incrimination and particularly those opening up
the eventuality of a prison sentence. All the proposals for a better definition came to
rely on the police officer’s ability to qualify the suspected acts as a penal matter. So
the first complaint related to qualification of the situations requiring garde à vue. The
system fell short when it came to the assistance of a lawyer. Here the European Court
of Human Rights is adamant: according to article 6, assistance must be provided from
themoment a person is detained and the incriminating elements may not be compiled
without the active presence of a lawyer.2
1 Salduz v Turkey (2009) 49 EHRR 19.
2 App No 7377/03 Dayanan v Turkey, 13 Oct 2009; App No 5472900 Adamkiewicz v Poland, 2 Mar 2010.
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We moved into a ponderous programme of consultations. Of course few bodies
consulted, except the police, wanted to come forward as supporters of garde à vue.
And the lawyers’ organisations realized the time had come for a full bodied pressure
to increase the presence and especially the function of counsel during garde à vue.
So far nobody quite knows what the government would have made of the situation
unwillingly created by the proposed reform.
C. CHALLENGE
Then all of a sudden, we came up with one of these legal happenings which can make
history. Our country has recently revised its constitution and provided for the first
time a form of judicial control of the conformity of existing law to the constitution.
This works through a question set before the Constitutional Council by one of the
high courts, the Cour de Cassation or Conseil d’Etat, when having to apply the law
to a given case. There have been so far very few cases, but many lawyers dealing with
criminal cases were waiting in ambush to question the existing legal status of garde
à vue. And so the Constitutional Council has given its answer, in one of the very first
decisions using its powers to control existing law, on 30 July 2010.
The existing legislation was challenged on several grounds. First, reference was
made to the constitutional principle that the judiciary is the guardian of individual
freedom. This could mean that the police were acting outside their jurisdiction when
enforcing a measure implying detention. This argument went on to say that the
Procureur, called upon to control the reasons for detention, was not a fully fledged
member of the judiciary, and that in any case he could not exercise proper control
without actually seeing the person.
Beyond this, the argument continued, the constraints involved in garde à vue by
far exceeded what could be reasonably required for the needs of the investigation.
Thirdly, the material conditions of detention in this way were not compatible with
human dignity. Finally, the suspect’s rights were not properly taken into account,
in that there was no requirement to remind him of his right to silence, and
that the lawyer’s assistance as provided was but a sham, delivered under unequal
circumstances.
Before answering, the Council had to define its method, and in particular whether
or not it would be held by precedent in what was a completely new scope for its
supervision of the law as decided in Parliament. Criminal procedure is not a new field
of law, and in particular the above mentioned rules for garde à vue had come under
the scrutiny of the Council in the recent years, as the Council had been called upon
to examine preventively the constitutionality of new laws reforming or adjusting the
system. The new procedure, allowing the Council to review existing law, could not
ignore the previous decisions which could, in its preventive role, have validated the
criticized prescriptions. And so the Council ruled as a preliminary stand for its future
decisions. But the Council went on to allow that this could not apply if there had been
a notable change in circumstances. And here we read, not without surprise and some
admiration, that such a change in circumstances is acknowledged by the Council.
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Yes, the conditions for garde à vue had been declared valid in 1993. Yes, since then
guarantees had even been reinforced. But some recent changes in the general regime
of criminal procedure and particularly in the practice of the authorities had led to a
much more frequent use of these powers and upset the delicate balance between
obligations and rights.
And there, what had previously been considered rather condescendingly as the
thesis of the naïve do-gooders suddenly attained the status of constitutional law.
The Council took into account the fact that more and more people are incriminated
without a criminal procedure stricto sensu being opened, and on the basis of the facts
reported to the procureur by the police in the course of garde à vue. Garde à vue had
become the preferred way to draw up a case.
The Council goes on to note, diplomatically but rather unkindly, that an officier
de police judiciaire is not the qualified officer that he used to be. Because of the
necessities of overwork, the capacity to ordain garde à vue has widened to include the
more lowly members of the police forces, and the number of those entitled had more
than doubled since the Council’s 1993 decision.
Garde à vue had become common practice, concerning 790,000 persons in 2009.
It was time to reopen the discussion. And the constitutional judge went on to do so, in
the characteristic balancing tone with which French commentators are familiar. The
Council proceeds first to do away with the argument based on human dignity: it has
not been the legislator’s remit to provide for the material conditions of garde à vue,
and the law may not come under criticism because of the way it is applied by the
administration.
But we now come to the core of the matter. The law must reconcile the necessity
of preventing criminal activities and identifying perpetrators of such acts and the
enjoyment of the liberties inscribed in the Constitution, among which are individual
freedom as protected by the judiciary and the right to be properly defended. Garde
à vue is not unconstitutional as such, on the contrary it is a necessity, but it must be
accompanied by the appropriate guarantees.
Guarantees were deemed sufficient so far as the intervention of the judiciary was
provided for at an early stage in the procedure. To come to this conclusion, the
Conseil had to anticipate on a very serious matter which will crop up again about
the other proposed reforms. It stated that the magistrates sitting in court and the
magistrates charged with the prosecution were both part of the judiciary. This meant
that the control of the prosecuting magistrate during the first 24 or 48 hours, if
properly exercised by an authority who could always require to see the detainee,
was acceptable. And the responsibility would automatically pass on to a fully fledged
magistrate after the expiration of these very short delays.
However, the Conseil was not happy with the situation during the garde à
vue. The person held can be interrogated without counsel’s support, whatever the
circumstances of the case, without consideration of any particular problems relating
to the conservation of proof or the protection of third parties. The person is not even
alerted to the fact that he is entitled to remain silent.
And so the Conseil concluded that taking into account the change in perspective
the procedure had become unbalanced and no longer conformed to the constitution.
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A few weeks later, the Constitutional Council confirmed it really meant business.
In another case involving the traditional powers of retention used by the custom
authorities, an age long practice based in law, the Council ruled that the impossibility
for the detained person to access immediately legal help was contrary to his
constitutional rights.
There will be much rejoicing in human rights circles. But for the persons
actually detained or susceptible to be so, they will come to understand a victory
in constitutional matters is not like winning your case in any ordinary court. The
Conseil stepping carefully in the field of these new powers has shown itself to be very
creative. The decision concludes that it is not up to theConseil to provide the properly
balanced statutory draft that will conform to its ruling, but for parliament. And it
quietly decides that the public authorities shall need a year to sort out the matter and
come up with a proper reform, meanwhile the unconstitutionality of existing law on
garde à vue shall be of no effect on individual cases.
We now in France hold our breath, as the message from the executive has radically
changed. Our minister of justice is caught between the pincers of the Constitutional
Council and the European Court of Human Rights. The government’s goal is now
to radically reduce, hopefully halve, the number of persons held in garde à vue.
A new draft comes up with a much more precise definition of the situations allowing
this form of detention, new openings for defence. Counsel for the defence may be
present at the start of the interrogation and access the documents drawn up by the
police. The defendant will be reminded he is under no obligation to answer, and a
written summing-up by the lawyer will accompany the proceedings. A number of
practical precautions are provided for, to ensure the dignity of the person detained.
Will this satisfy the constitutional requirements? In spite of all these manifestations
of goodwill, the proposals, at their present stage, still reveal a number of astute
ways of slipping out of the new constraints. One is to proclaim that a person may
voluntarily accept interrogation, and none of the new rules may then apply. Another is
to proclaim none of these precautions apply to the exceptional prolonged situations of
garde à vue provided for in the serious incriminations of terrorism and such matters.
And here and there, loopholes are provided for the administration to refuse, for
some superior reason, and under the supervision of the Parquet, the new guarantees
provided for by the law.
Just as I was concluding my story, only a day ago, our Cour de Cassation has
now joined the chase: it has ruled that proper implementation of article 6 of the
Convention requires complete assistance from counsel, even in those situations where
exceptional reasons allow for prolonged detention. This means the proposed draft
under discussion must again be amended.
Nicole Questiaux
(This text is an excerpt from a memorial lecture given for Joëlle Godard – “Much
Ado About Justice: Reforming Criminal Procedure in France” – at the University of
Edinburgh on the 22nd October 2010. It has been editorially prepared by the Review,
which bears full responsibility for any errors or omissions.)
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Slander of Property:
Continental Tyre Group Ltd v Robertson
In 1898, the last proper slander of property case, Bruce v JM Smith,1 was decided
in Scotland.2 Since then, in cases where a potential slander of property issue has
arisen, the action has been brought and decided, at least partially, through the law
of defamation. Continental Tyre Group Ltd v Robertson,3 and the subsequent appeal
to Sheriff Principal Bowen,4 presented an opportunity to depart from this general
trend and to resurrect the viability of the more appropriate cause of action – slander
of property.
A. THE FACTS AND FIRST INSTANCE DECISION
Continental Tyre Group Limited, the pursuer, is a seller and distributor of motor
car tyres manufactured by Continental Group. The defender, Alan Robertson, owns
a tyre and exhaust business in Linlithgow. It was alleged that the defender had
made numerous defamatory comments relating to the “barum” tyre which is sold
and distributed by the pursuer. One remark in particular, alleged to have been made
in September 2009, was founded upon by the pursuer. The thrust of this statement
was that the barum tyre was unsafe and that the defender “would not put them on
his worst enemy’s car”. The pursuer sought interdict to prevent the defender from
making further false and defamatory statements.
At first instance Sheriff Kinloch held that the statements averred were defamatory,
but that the remedy craved was too wide to be given effect. The sheriff, in reaching
“an unusual result”, rejected the first three submissions advanced by the defender.5
In rejecting the first submission Sheriff Kinloch adopted a contextual approach.
By reference to the defender’s own averments, which contained a general denial
that he had questioned the safety of the barum tyre, the Sheriff concluded that in
such circumstances there was no question of qualified privilege being applicable.6 It
therefore followed that submission two, prefaced as it was on the acceptance that the
case gave rise to qualified privilege (submission one), was also to be rejected: malice
need only be pled where the case engages qualified privilege or verbal injury.7 The
third submission by the defender, that the action was fundamentally deficient due
1 (1898) 1 F 327.
2 This point is noted in E Reid, Personality, Confidentiality and Privacy in Scots Law (2010) 106.
3 Continental Tyre Group Ltd v Robertson, unreported, 25 Aug 2010.
4 Continental Tyre Group Ltd v Robertson, 2011 GWD 14-321, 2011 WL 1130227.
5 Continental Tyre (first instance) at para 15.
6 Para 4.
7 Para 6.
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to being misconstrued as a case of defamation, was also rejected.8 Having rejected
the first three averments on behalf of the defender, Sheriff Kinloch sustained the
fourth submission.9 On the basis that the crave sought was too general and wide to
be enforced, the action failed.
B. THE APPEAL
This decision was appealed, along with a motion to lodge a minute of amendment.
Counsel for the pursuer argued that the sheriff had erred, as the original crave
was sufficiently narrow and precise.10 Further, even if this was not the case,
counsel noted that it was open to the court to amend a crave in light of the
evidence led.11 Dismissing the action was therefore unnecessary. Nevertheless, in
the alternative, counsel submitted that the minute of amendment lodged would cure
the shortcomings identified at first instance.
The defender opposed amendment and lodged a cross-appeal as to the relevancy
of the pursuer’s case, arguing that, at best, the sheriff ought to have concluded that
the pursuer was required to plead a case on the basis of verbal injury. Further, “there
was no link between criticism of the brand of tyres and the distributor of them”.12 The
net result, the defender submitted, was that the prevailing defamation test contained
in Sim – that the words must tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-
thinking members of society generally – could neither be engaged nor satisfied.13
Despite entertaining reservations as to whether a court would grant an order in
accordance with the amended crave, Sheriff Principal Bowen upheld the appeal and
allowed a proof before answer.14
C. ANALYSIS
The primary issue of concern is the stance taken on the defender’s submission that
this was a case of verbal injury and not defamation. In response to this submission at
first instance, Sheriff Kinloch, having resolved that the case was one of defamation,
felt it unnecessary to address the verbal injury question; whilst, on appeal, the Sheriff
Principal stated that the main point is to identify that there is an actionable wrong.
With respect, the present author rejects these approaches.
The defender’s submission that the statement is not enough to constitute
defamation seems principled and correct. It was alleged that the defender stated that
the barum tyre is unsafe and that he would not put that tyre on his worst enemy’s
car. At first instance Sheriff Kinloch accepted that this was defamatory because,
8 Para 8.
9 Para 14.
10 Continental Tyre (on appeal) at para 13.
11 Webster v Lord Advocate 1985 SC 173.
12 Continental Tyre (on appeal) at para 18.
13 Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237 at 1240. The “Sim” test was acknowledged as representing the law
of Scotland in Steele v Scottish Daily Record and Sunday Mail 1970 SLT 53.
14 Continental Tyre (on appeal) at para 25.
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in his view, such a remark is capable of lowering the reputation of the pursuer, a
tyre distributor, in the minds of right thinking members of society generally.15 This
test, analogous as it is to that contained within Sim, is the correct test to apply.16
Nevertheless, the present author respectfully disagrees with the learned Sheriff’s
conclusion on the point.17 As Norrie observes:18
. . . it is unlikely that an allegation concerning a person’s property will be defamatory of that
person, for it will seldom amount to an attack on a person’s character, honour and reputation
to state that the property he or she owns is defective in some way.
Nor is it defamatory to state that another distributes property which one believes
to be less than desirable or unsafe. Such a comment could cause the former, the
distributor, economic loss, but economic loss – or indeed loss of goodwill – does not
in itself sustain a claim of defamation. The law allows vehement criticism. Indeed the
law allows the dipping of pens (and tongues) in gall where a person is expressing a
legitimate criticism.19 The statement founded upon in Continental is a criticism of
the product, albeit a criticism in the strongest possible terms. It is not defamatory.
In order for the pursuer’s reputation to have been defamed as a result of this
statement the pursuer would require either: (i) to be the manufacturer of the tyres or;
(ii) for the defender to have stated that the tyres are unsafe, that the pursuer knows
them to be unsafe and, in this knowledge, continues to distribute the tyre. This would
lower the pursuer’s reputation in the minds of right thinking members of society
generally because it may reasonably be supposed that a tyre distributor, with due
regard to their professional expertise, should only distribute tyres that they believe to
be safe. Where a distributor is alleged to have acted contrary to this supposition their
reputation would be lowered in the minds of persons generally.
Sheriff Kinloch therefore, in effect, takes a broader view of what may harm the
reputation of such a distributor, as he appears to believe it would lower the pursuer
in the mind of right thinking members of society to be distributing unsafe tyres,
whether knowingly or not. He, in effect, imposes an expectation on distributors to
ensure that the tyres they dispense are safe. To do otherwise is to fall short of what
15 It was concluded that “to say that the pursuers are distributing unsafe tyres does . . . impugn their
character or business reputation”. See: Continental Tyres (first instance) at para 8.
16 On appeal Sheriff Principal Bowen was addressed by counsel for the pursuer on the basis that Walker,
founding on Waddell v Roxburgh (1894) 21 R 883, provides the test for defamation. A defamatory
statement, the pursuer and appellant thus argued, is one which would lead “reasonably, careful,
prudent, fair minded and judicious individuals [to] regard such a statement as disparaging” (See
D M Walker, The Law of Delict in Scotland, 2nd edn (1981) 760). This markedly differs from the
most often utilised test of Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237 at 1240: “would the words tend to lower
the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally?” One would suggest that
to lower a person in estimation is to go further than to disparage. For instance, one who is ridiculed
is not necessarily lowered in estimation; he is however disparaged. Semantics matter in the framing of
the test within this context.
17 Continental Tyres (first instance) at para 8.
18 K McK Norrie, Defamation and Related Actions in Scots Law (1995) 45.
19 See Spiller v Joseph and Others [2010] UKSC 53, [2010] 3 WLR 1791 at para 20 per Lord Phillips
(citing Gardiner v Fairfax (1942) 42 SR (NSW) 171 at 174).
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is expected amongst the public generally. This appears too wide. Context is central in
assessing whether a statement is defamatory. Here the pursuer is a distributor and so
will neither have the obligation nor capacity to test the tyres which he distributes. Due
regard is instead placed upon safety tests. For a distributor to place reliance upon the
safety views of others is unobjectionable, and an averment that a specific tyre which
they distribute is unsafe will not be defamatory of the pursuer. Such a statement
is commercially undesirable from the pursuer’s perspective. That is, however, very
different from being defamatory.
Although not defamatory, the statements in the present case were potentially
actionable. Verbal injury is an actionable wrong “other than” defamation which
amounts to an attack on character, honour and reputation.20 In Continental verbal
injury, specifically slander of property, would have been the appropriate action, as
counsel for the defender suggested. In order for there to be slander of property a
false malicious statement on the quality of the pursuer’s property must have been
made and have caused the pursuer loss.21 Assuming that the statement is false and
that loss resulted, the pursuer in the present case would have but one constituent part
of the action to aver and prove –malice.22
The argument that the present action, properly framed, is one of verbal injury and
not defamation was viewed with greater credence on appeal than at first instance.23
Regrettably, however, Sheriff Principal Bowen did not explore the question in depth,
despite observing that it was “not straightforward [as to] whether what is alleged
constitutes defamation of the pursuers or is simply to be viewed as an attack on their
product”.24 The Sheriff Principal instead rejected the submission on the basis that
“this distinction may not matter greatly for the purpose of an action for interdict. The
question is whether there is an actionable wrong, and if so whether the pursuers are
entitled to seek to prevent repetition”.25
Potentially there is a wrong, but whether it is actionable depends on whether the
constituent elements of the appropriate cause of action are satisfied. How the wrong is
framed is therefore central. Where the defender submits that there may be a wrong,
but the cause of action lies in the law of verbal injury, not defamation, the judge
should decide the point and provide his reasoning. He should not err on the side
of continuation by ordering a proof before answer, requiring simply that there be
an actionable wrong. This is not a case in which the pursuer has pled defamation
esto verbal injury. The submission of the pursuer is one of defamation only. It is a
legal question whether the words used are capable of bearing the meaning averred,
and thus whether the words are capable of amounting to a defamatory statement.26
Without answering this question in the affirmative there cannot truly be a “relevant
20 Norrie, Defamation (n 18) 33.
21 Norrie, Defamation (n 18) 46-47; Reid, Confidentiality, Personality and Privacy (n 2) 105-106.
22 What constitutes malice, and the difficulty of establishing it, are questions for another more substantive
paper.
23 At first instance see para 8, and on appeal see para 23.
24 Continental Tyre (on appeal) at para 23.
25 Ibid.
26 Russell v Stubbs Ltd 1913 (HL) 14 at 24 per Lord Shaw.
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case which would entitle the pursuers to seek interdict”.27 A proof, or indeed a proof
before answer, should only be required where the words are, with due regard to
context and “the reasonable, natural or necessary” interpretation of the words, so
capable of bearing a defamatory meaning.28 At such a proof the question is whether
the words do in fact, with regard to the context and circumstances within which they
were made, bare a defamatory meaning as averred. Where the cause of action pled is
unsuitable a proof is unnecessary. In circumstances such as those in the present case
there is a potential wrong, but it is not actionable as a relevant case of defamation has
not been pled. A proof will not change this.
Lord Hunter opined in Argyllshire Weavers Ltd that the ingredients of the
particular wrong known as slander of property are not well illustrated by decision.29
Lord Hunter, like the present author, attributes this to the fact that the distinction
drawn between defamation and verbal injury has not always been maintained.30 To
adopt an “actionable wrong” approach, and thereby allow a case to proceed to proof
before answer whilst erroneously classified as one of defamation, is to perpetuate this
erosion to the benefit of the pursuer.31 In short, the distinction between defamation
and verbal injury must be reasserted andmaintained. It is only where the words would
“tend to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society
generally”32 that an action should be entertained as one of defamation. In making
this assessment the judge should examine the words used, apply the test strictly, and
place due regard upon the context in which, and to whom, the statement is made.
With such an approach – emphasising as it does, the legal question – it will be seen
that most statements are not defamatory, but rather verbal injuries. That is not to
deny an action: it is merely to recognise that defamation is a niche, not the default
action for pursuing injuries to reputation.
D. CONCLUSION
Scotland is a relatively small jurisdiction with limited litigation based upon
reputational protection. Much of our current difficulty with the law of verbal
injury is due to the fact that the courts have rarely in the last century had an
opportunity to articulate and advance relevant jurisprudence. With this in mind,
where potential verbal injury cases do arise, the opportunity should be taken
to analyse and rationalise authorities, enunciate principles and clarify distinctions
between neighbouring actions. These cases should not be disposed of on adjectival
grounds at first instance, and allowed to proceed on appeal to proof before answer,
without first dealing with substantive points of relevancy which are rightly raised by
27 Continental Tyre (on appeal) at para 17.
28 Russell v Stubbs Ltd 1913 (HL) 14 at 23 per Lord Shaw.
29 Argyllshire Weavers Limited and Others v A Macaulay (Tweeds) Limited and Others 1965 SLT 21 at
35 per Lord Hunter.
30 Ibid.
31 Intention to injure (“malice”) and falsity are both presumed in the law of defamation; both must be
proven in an action for verbal injury
32 Sim v Stretch [1936] 2 All ER 1237 at 1240.
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counsel. Dismissal of the argument that this case was one of verbal injury and not
defamation at first instance, and the lack of exploration of the point when raised again
upon appeal, is therefore disappointing. It is only through rationally distinguishing
between causes of action and their respective purposes that the cycle may be broken,
verbal injury revived, and coherence amongst authorities subsequently achieved. It is
for this reason that the decision in Continental represents a missed opportunity.
Ryan T Whelan
(The author is grateful to Greg Gordon, Robin Evans-Jones, Andrew Simpson, Leanne
Bain and Findlay Stark for their comments on earlier drafts, and to the Arts and
Humanities Research Council for financial support.)
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Apparent Authority in Agency:
Gregor Homes Ltd v Emlick
In a previous volume of this journal,1 a scheme for apparent or ostensible authority
in agency (originally proposed in the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia)2 was offered.
In the recent case of Gregor Homes Ltd v Emlick3 Sheriff Holligan analysed
apparent authority, making reference to this proposed scheme. This article analyses
the Sheriff’s decision. Apparent authority is a central concept in the law of agency,
operating to protect third parties from problems caused where an agent acts without
sufficient authority. As a general rule, an agent in this position cannot bind his
principal in a contract with a third party. Where, however, the principal has acted
in such a way as to create the impression of authority, in the context of an action
raised by the third party, the principal can be prevented from denying that the agent
was properly authorised. If apparent authority is successfully proved, the third party is
entitled to damages from the principal to compensate him for the loss of the expected
contract.
A. THE FACTS
The dispute centred on missives entered into between the pursuers, a company
engaged in the development and sale of houses, and the defender, a businessman. The
latter had contracted to purchase plot numbers 5, 8 and 9 Belford Lodge, Sunbury
1 D Busch and L Macgregor, “Apparent authority in agency: some international perspectives” (2007) 11
EdinLR 349.
2 L Macgregor, “Agency and mandate”, in The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue
(2002) para 76.
3 Edinburgh Sheriff Court, 11 Jan 2011, available at http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/A1523_
09.html
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Street, Edinburgh from the pursuers. The defenders were to carry out works to the
property to consolidate the separate plots into one townhouse, and the total price to
be paid by the defender for the plots as developed was over £3 million.
At times during the development works, the defender was abroad. In his absence,
decisions were made by another individual, Scott Rutherford. Mr Rutherford acted
as project manager of the property, and was employed by Belgrave Scotland Limited,
a company controlled by the defender.
The missives contained a formula for calculation of the date of entry which made
reference to the date of issue of a Certificate of Practical Completion. At a meeting
in November 2008, the project manager for the pursuers and Mr Rutherford signed
a document agreeing that this could now be issued. Although the date of entry and
payment of the price were triggered in terms of the missives, the defender failed to
pay the purchase price, indicating that he had no funds to do so. The sale of a property
on which he was relying for finance had fallen through. The parties entered into
discussions seeking to resolve the dispute, but the proposals made by the defender
for payment of a lower price with security for the balance were unacceptable to the
pursuers. The property was remarketed by the pursuers, and sold to a Mr Hogg at
the lower price of £1.7 million. Mr Hogg subsequently transferred his interest in the
property to the defender. The pursuer raised an action for breach of contract, seeking
damages to compensate them for the difference between the price agreed under the
missives and the price the sellers achieved on the sale to Mr Hogg.
The defender argued that Mr Rutherford had neither actual nor apparent
or ostensible authority to agree that practical completion could be issued.
Mr Rutherford’s actions in this respect were unauthorised, and did not bind the
defender. The formula for calculation of the date of entry had not, therefore, been
triggered and the defender was not liable to pay the purchase price. The value of the
decision lies in the Sheriff’s analysis of the principles of actual and apparent authority
as applied to Mr Rutherford’s actings as an agent.
B. ACTUAL AUTHORITY
The parties were agreed on the meaning of actual authority, Sheriff Holligan
confirming:4
Such authority may be express or implied and implied authority may arise from a course
of dealing between the parties and the circumstances of the case. . . As Diplock LJ said in
Freeman (at page 502) actual authority is a legal relationship between principal and agent
created by a consensual agreement to which they alone are party.
The Sheriff found that Mr Rutherford had actual implied authority, which was
sufficient for him to sign a document confirming that practical completion could be
issued. This provided an answer to the dispute: Mr Rutherford had been authorised
to agree the issue of practical completion, and had bound his principal in this respect.
The defender was in breach of the missives and liable in damages to the pursuer.
4 Para 35, referring to Lord Diplock’s judgment in Freeman and Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties
(Mangal) Ltd [1964] 2 QB 480.
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C. APPARENT OR OSTENSIBLE AUTHORITY
(1) A definition and two questions
In case his conclusion on actual authority was erroneous, Sheriff Holligan considered
whether Mr Rutherford had apparent authority to bind his principal. The Sheriff
quoted Diplock LJ’s leading definition:5
An “apparent” or “ostensible” authority. . . is a legal relationship between the principal and
the contractor created by a representation, made by the principal to the contractor, intended
to be and in fact acted upon by the contractor, that the agent has authority to enter on
behalf of the principal into a contract of a kind within the scope of the “apparent” authority,
so as to render the principal liable to perform any obligations imposed upon him by such
contract. To the relationship so created the agent is a stranger. He need not be (although he
generally is) aware of the existence of the representation but he must not purport to make
the agreement as principal himself. The representation, when acted upon by the contractor
by entering into a contract with the agent, operates as an estoppel preventing the principal
from asserting that he is not bound by the contract. It is irrelevant whether the agent had
actual authority to enter into the contract.
The Sheriff indicated that there were two essential questions for discussion: firstly
whether apparent authority is part of the law of agency or is rather part of the
law of personal bar; and secondly, what the component parts of the concept are.
Clearly these questions are interlinked: potentially, the first can be answered only
by answering the second, i.e. by comparing the component parts of both apparent
authority and personal bar.
(2) Question one: the nature of apparent authority
The Sheriff noted the extensive influence of English cases on Scots law. Diplock LJ’s
judgment in Freeman has, he noted, been “repeatedly referred to in the authorities
and textbooks, both in England and in Scotland”6 and was “cited with approval in
Scotland”7 in Dornier GmbH v Cannon8and British Shoe Company Ltd v Double M
Shah Ltd.9 English influence has not, however, been entirely positive. It is not clear
in English law whether apparent authority is a form of estoppel or part of the law of
agency.10 In Scots law, although Lord Rodger described apparent authority as “built
upon the doctrine known as estoppel in English law and personal bar in Scots law,”11
he was “doing no more than recording the agreed position of the parties”.12 This led
the Sheriff to conclude that “it is one thing to say something is similar to an estoppel
5 Para 41, quoting Freeman at 503 per Diplock LJ, emphasis added by Sheriff Holligan.
6 Para 39.
7 Ibid.
8 1991 SC 310.
9 1980 SC 311.
10 The Sheriff noted this difference of opinion (paras 39-40), citing Freeman at 503 per Diplock LJ for
the former view and noting also Steyn J’s reluctance to enter this debate in Polish Steamship Co v AJ
Williams Fuels (Overseas Sales) Limited (“The Suwalki”) [1989] 1 Lloyds Rep 511 at 514.
11 Bank of Scotland v Brunswick (1987) Ltd (No 2) 1997 SC 226 at 234.
12 Gregor Homes at para 39, citing Bank of Scotland at 234 per Lord Rodger.
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or bar but it is quite another to say all the varied rules and application of bar apply
with equal force to ostensible authority”.13
By taking this approach, the Sheriff gave himself the freedom to depart from the
established criteria of personal bar in framing his definition of apparent authority.
Reading between the lines, the Sheriff fears that classifying apparent authority as a
type of personal bar would be to apply to the concept restrictive criteria.
The Sheriff’s comments made in this context on the application of English
precedents are worth quoting:14
I do not think it is correct, or helpful, to attempt to determine the true content of the law of
ostensible authority in Scotland by reference to whatever may be, at any given time, the law
of estoppel in England. As has been said estoppel has many variants and a wholly different
background to personal bar in Scotland.
(3) Question two: the criteria of apparent authority
In 2002, the current author asked whether apparent authority was a form of personal
bar,15 and suggested that it comprised the following four elements:
(a) the principal, through representation or conduct;
(b) induced the third party to believe that the agent was authorised;
(c) the third party relied on this representation; and
(d) the third party has suffered loss through this reliance.
Since then, Reid and Blackie have published the first major work on the Scots law
of personal bar,16 and the current author (with Danny Busch) has applied Reid and
Blackie’s scheme for personal bar to apparent authority in agency.17 It appears that
the Sheriff was not referred to this author’s article, and his analysis draws only on the
relatively brief comments published in the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia in 2002.
It will be recalled that the Sheriff concluded that apparent authority was part of the
law of agency. He nevertheless proceeded with the same exercise carried out by the
current author and Busch: that is, analysing apparent authority by reference to Reid
and Blackie’s scheme. From this work he found support for his view that “personal bar
is not an exact replica of estoppel”.18 His final summary of the law is worth quoting in
full:
I respectfully endorse the careful analysis of the law of personal bar by the authors in
relation to the issue before me. The inconsistent conduct comprises a representation as
to the agent’s authority, coupled with its later repudiation. In terms of unfairness the
authors say “there must be an element of unfairness in the event that the putative principal
repudiates the existence of the agency”. In the context of agency, unfairness is found in
reliance by, and potential prejudice to, the third party. On the topic of prejudice, it is said
13 Para 41.
14 Ibid.
15 Macgregor (n 2) para 76 (“A form of personal bar?”), noted in Gregor Homes at para 37.
16 E C Reid and J W G Blackie, Personal Bar (2006).
17 Busch and Macgregor (n 1).
18 Para 43, citing Reid and Blackie, Personal Bar (n 16) para 13.14.
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that in most cases it is self-evident that the third party would suffer prejudice were the
principal to be permitted to deny the agent’s authority. Therefore, it is not the prejudice
flowing from the representation itself, in any temporal sense, but prejudice flowing from
permitting the principal the right to deny the agent’s authority.
The Sheriff endorsed the analysis of Lord Rodger in Bank of Scotland, describing
apparent authority as containing only “. . . two ingredients, namely a holding out and
the transacting by the third party”.19 He noted in particular that this case “does not
say there has to be a loss based on reliance”,20 an approach shared with Freeman. The
Sheriff was at pains to avoid the need for a proof of loss and this is, essentially, the rea-
son why he suggests the use of the two-part rather than a possible four-part scheme.
The following quote contains, in essence, the Sheriff’s own articulation of apparent
authority:21
Put in very general terms, the principal does, or permits to be done, something which causes
the third party to believe that the agent has authority to act on his behalf. The third party
acts in that belief. The third party seeks to exercise his rights relying upon what he and
the agent have done. The third party takes action against the principal. The principal seeks
to disown the actions of the agent. The law prevents the principal from doing so. To do
otherwise would be unfair. The mechanism by which that is done is to say the principal is
barred from doing so. Bar acts against the operation of a right which, in this case, is the
repudiation of the agent’s act.
(4) Application of the law to the facts
Turning once more to the facts of the case, the Sheriff held that there was both a
representation to the effect that Mr Rutherford was the defender’s agent and that
the pursuers relied thereon. Ostensible authority was, in his view, part of the law of
agency and contains the two elements of representation and reliance. His application
of Reid and Blackie’s idea of personal bar led him to the same conclusion: there was
both inconsistent conduct and unfairness. Whilst keeping an open mind on whether
prejudice to the pursuer was required, he found it to be present in any event where
the defender disowned Mr Rutherford’s acts. Finally, he accepted the proposition
that, once representation and reliance were established, the onus of proof shifted to
the defender to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that Mr Rutherford was not
authorised by the principal to act as he did. The defender had failed to discharge that
onus. This led to the conclusion that Mr Rutherford had bound the defender as his
principal by agreeing practical completion and triggered both the date of entry and
liability of the defender for payment of the price.
D. CONCLUSIONS
The “chicken and egg” nature of the apparent authority/estoppel debate in English
law is visible from the analysis in the leading English text:22
19 Para 38, citing Lord Rodger’s approach in Bank of Scotland.
20 Para 38.
21 Para 41.
22 P Watts and F M B Reynolds, Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency, 19th edn (2010) para 8-028.
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[C]ases on agency and the related notion of apparent ownership which use what would now
be called estoppel reasoning can also be traced back many years, and indeed some of them
even seem to figure among the origins of the general doctrine of estoppel.
If apparent authority is, as the Sheriff has concluded, part of the law of agency, then
what is the nature and rationale of the concept? If apparent authority is an application
of personal bar, it must share the same underlying rationale: that is, the prevention of
inconsistent conduct. The principal is “at fault” because he has led the third party to
believe that the agent was authorised. It follows, therefore, that the principal should
be liable to the third party in damages. If apparent authority is not part of personal
bar, it need not share this rationale. Merely by classifying it as part of the law of
agency, the Sheriff takes us little further in answering this question.
The Sheriff’s approach, although typical in its focus on personal bar, is nevertheless
problematic. The significant issue is the principal’s conduct: it is that conduct
which triggers the third party’s remedy. Personal bar cannot be the “source” of an
action.
The essential difference between the two part scheme (the Sheriff’s preferred
option) and the four part scheme is that the former makes no reference to the
requirement on the part of the third party to prove loss. The Sheriff noted confusion
on this point in English law. Whereas some cases suggest that only an alteration
of position is required, others indicate that the third party must act on the faith
of the representation.23 Reid and Blackie suggest that prejudice is, in most cases,
“self-evident”.24 They indicate that, once a representation as to authority has been
established, the onus shifts to the principal “. . . to show that the third party had
actual or constructive knowledge of any limitation upon it”.25 The authority given
for this statement is, however, the leading English text, and, as the Sheriff reminded
us, caution should be exercised in the use of English authorities.26 On balance, is
“loss” a necessary element of the test? It can potentially be dealt with at the stage of
quantification of damages. If the contract which the third party thought he had with
the principal would have been a losing one, for example, because the principal was
insolvent, the third party would be unlikely to recover any damages. This question
requires deeper analysis. It is interesting to note in this context that European legal
systems which are not based on estoppel (such as France, Belgium, the Netherlands)
do not require proof of loss.27
23 The English case law is summarised by the Sheriff at para 38.
24 Reid and Blackie, Personal Bar (n 16) para 13-11.
25 Ibid para 13-10.
26 The authority cited is the leading English text, G S Bower and A Turner, Estoppel by Representation,
4th edn by P Feltham, D Hochberg and T Leech, 4th edn (2004) para IX.2.8.
27 See the analysis in D Busch and L Macgregor, “Comparative law evaluation”, in Busch and Macgregor
(eds), The Unauthorised Agent: Perspectives from European and Comparative Law (2009) 385 at
403. The equivalent rule under the DCFR II-6:104 (“Scope of authority”) provides that where
the principal holds out his agent as possessing authority, the unauthorised agent is treated as fully
authorised. As a result, the agent has the ability to create an actual contract between principal
and third party, notwithstanding his lack of authority. This being the case, the rule is not based on
estoppel.
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The Sheriff’s judgment is notable for its detailed and careful analysis of apparent
authority. In this respect it can be contrasted with the majority of Outer House
decisions where the difficult issues are side-stepped. This being the case, any
criticisms made here are minor ones. The judgment is a significant step towards
greater clarity in this difficult area.
Laura Macgregor
University of Edinburgh
EdinLR Vol 15 pp 448-452
Consumer Redress for Misleading and
Aggressive Practices
The Law Commissions have issued a joint consultation on “Consumer Redress for
Misleading and Aggressive Practices”,1 which proposes some interesting reforms in
the area of consumer redress. The background to the paper is the implementation
of the European Union’s Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005 in May
2008 by the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations.2 The Directive
is designed to ban “unfair commercial practices harming consumers’ economic
interests”.3 “Commercial practices” is widely defined so that the directive and the
regulations ban misleading advertising, false claims about products and services,
deceptive pricing, high pressure sales techniques, and many other kinds of unfair
practices.4 Unfairness may occur as a result of a misleading action, misleading
omission, an aggressive practice,5 or by being one of the thirty one practices set
out in Schedule 1. In addition, practices which are contrary to “the requirements
of professional diligence” are also banned.6 This is designed to be a catch-all category
to ensure that the regulations are future-proof.7 With the exception of the Schedule
1 practices, it must be shown that the practice would cause an “average consumer”
1 Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission, Consumer Redress for Misleading and Aggressive
Practices: A Joint Consultation Paper (Law Com CP No 199 and Scot Law Com DP No 149, 2011).
This project was formerly referred to as Misrepresentations and Unfair Commercial Practices and this
title has inadvertently appeared on the front cover of the printed discussion paper.
2 SI 2008/1277, implementing Directive 2005/29/EC concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial
practices in the internal market, OJ 2005 L149/22.
3 Directive art 1. The UK regulations follow closely the wording of the Directive.
4 Directive art 2(d).
5 Art 5(4).
6 Art 5(2).
7 See G B Abbamonte, “The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and its general prohibition”, in
S Weatherill and U Bernitz (eds), The Regulation of Unfair Commercial Practices under EC Directive
2005/29: New Rules and New Techniques (2007) 11 at 20-21.
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to take a different “transactional decision” or, in the case of the catch-all provision,
that it would “materially distort. . . the economic behaviour” of this hypothetical
person.8
The regulations are enforced by empowering Trading Standards Departments
and the Office of Fair Trading to bring criminal proceedings against rogue traders
and to obtain enforcement orders under Part 8 of the Enterprise Act 2002.9 What
the regulations do not provide is a private right of redress for their breach. It is,
of course, possible for victims of unfair practices to invoke existing contractual,
delictual or restitutionary remedies, as the Directive makes plain that it is “without
prejudice to contract law and, in particular, to the rules on the validity, formation
or effect of a contract”.10 Following pressure from consumer organisations, the Law
Commissions were invited to provide the Department of Business, Enterprise and
Regulatory Reform (now the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS))
with preliminary advice on this issue11 and in February 2010 BIS asked them to
advise on the simplification of the law on misrepresentation, the clarification of the
law on duress and the introduction of a private right of redress for victims of unfair
commercial practices. In April the Commissions published their joint consultation
paper.
A. THE CONSULTATION PAPER
The consultation paper acknowledges the scale of the problem of unfair trading:
according to research by Consumer Focus almost two-thirds of the population has
been the target of a scam within the last two years. Those who were victims lost
on average £175 though losses ranged from £50 to £800 with, occasionally, much
higher sums being involved. The annual cost of consumer detriment in Great Britain
arising solely from unfair commercial practices was estimated to be £3.3 billion.12 As
the consultation paper points out, rogue traders use a variety of practices to mislead
and pressure consumers. Existing private remedies might be used to recover such
losses. However, as the consultation paper points out, these remedies have been
developed in the context of commercial transactions between businesses and often
are ill-adapted to modern consumer circumstances. Where misleading statements
have been made the law of misrepresentation might in theory provide redress but it
8 SI 2008/1277 reg 3(3)(b).
9 The regulations have been considered in Office of Fair Trading v Purely Creative Ltd [2011] EWHC
106.
10 Directive art 3.2.
11 Law Commission, A Private Right of Redress for Unfair Commercial Practices? Preliminary Advice to
the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform on the Issues Raised (2008).
12 Consumer Focus, Waiting to be Heard: Giving Consumers the Right of Redress over Unfair
Commercial Practices (2009). In 2008 the Office of Fair Trading put the figure at £6.6 billion
using a different definition of consumer detriment: see Comptroller and Auditor General, Protecting
Consumers – The System for Enforcing Consumer Law (HC 2010-12, 1087) para 1.3.
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“presents a confusing patchwork of doctrines, based on case law which is inaccessible
to consumers and non-legal advisers”.13 The Commissions identified seven causes of
action showing that the problem “is not shortage of law but a superabundance”.14 In
the case of aggressive practices, the Commissions consider that there are “serious gaps
in the law” and that existing causes of action (duress, undue influence and harassment)
do not address the specific problems experienced by consumers”.15
It is not surprising that the Commissions conclude that there is a need for
legislation to give a private right of redress. What they propose is “a limited and
cautious reform”16 applying only to misleading actions and aggressive practices
where consumers have entered into contracts with traders or made a payment to
them. The latter point is designed to cover situations such as unjustified demands
relating to parking or “civil recovery” against alleged shoplifters. Land transactions
(not including lettings) and financial services will not be covered as the remedies
proposed might not be appropriate to the high value losses that can arise on the sale
of land and, in the case of financial services, because of the existing regime under
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. Misleading omissions would not be
covered nor would the thirty one specific practices in the Schedule. The exclusion
of misleading omissions is justified on the ground that it would introduce a general
duty of disclosure and that this would introduce uncertainty and encourage vexatious
claims. There is some force in these arguments though, given the impediments to
litigation, one wonders how realistic fear of an increase is. However, the limitation
is ameliorated by the fact that what might be seen as an omission can also be
presented as a positive misrepresentation. The exclusion of the Schedule 1 practices
will not matter a great deal as many are specific examples of misleading or aggressive
practices. It is not proposed to extend the remedies to breach of the catch-all practices
contrary to the “requirements of professional diligence”. Here again, it is unlikely that
many practices would fall solely into this category.
Where a consumer can establish the liability of the trader the Commissions
propose a two tier system of remedies, designed to be clear and simple. This is
justified on the basis that frequently fairly small sums of money will be in issue
and advice will often be sought from advisers who are not legally qualified. The
Tier 1 remedy, available in all cases, consists of a right to “unwind the contract”,
a phrase deliberately chosen to be more readily comprehensible than the technical
terms “rescission” and “reduction”. Under this remedy, where consumers act within
three months they would receive a refund of money paid and not be required to
meet any future obligations. While this would be adequate in many situations such
as bogus prize draw scams or the unjustified payments just referred to, there will be
situations where it is not appropriate because it is no longer possible to unwind the
transaction or the consumer has not acted within three months. Here the consumer
will be entitled to a discount on the purchase price and, to simplify its calculation,
13 Law Commissions, Consumer Redress (n 1) para 5.98.
14 Para 10.2.
15 Para 10.3.
16 Para 12.3.
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the Commissions suggest four bands from 0% to 100% depending on factors such as
the impact on the value of the product, the trader’s behaviour and time between the
commercial practice and the consumer’s complaint.
B. ANALYSIS
It will be objected that the Tier 1 remedies by themselves are a little too rough
and remedy and would leave some victims inadequately compensated. To meet this
criticism Tier 2 remedies are available. These would be available in addition to Tier 1
remedies but would be likely to be used only in serious cases where the misleading or
aggressive practice caused actual loss beyond the Tier 1 amounts. They would cover
economic loss suffered because of a practice and distress or inconvenience. A package
holiday which did not live up to the claims in the brochure might well be a case
where the Tier 2 remedies would come into play. Consumers misled by inaccurate
statements into booking a holiday will usually have little option but to make the best
of the situation they find themselves in when they reach their destination. Unwinding
the transaction is unlikely to be practicable, and their claims will be for economic loss
and disappointment.
However, such remedies are subject to a due diligence defence of the sort familiar
in consumer legislation creating criminal offences. Where traders can show that they
acted with due diligence they will not be liable for these indirect losses. This seems
a curious idea more relevant to the creation of liability in the first place than the
calculation of damages. The consumer has still suffered loss and whether that has
been because of an innocent, careless or even fraudulent error matters not. It seems
strange that of two innocent parties it should be the consumer who must bear the
loss.
It is envisaged that the proposed reforms will be effected by a new Act replacing
in relation to business to consumer transactions section 10 of the Law Reform
(Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985 and, in relation to England and
Wales, the Misrepresentation Act 1967. The reforms are welcome and much needed.
However, their efficacy needs to be set in the context of the wider problems of civil
redress. Existing procedures are not much resorted to by consumers and the Impact
Assessment annexed to the consultation paper does not suggest that the new remedy
will do much to alter this.17 It is pointed out that a simple remedy may encourage
criminal courts to make more compensation orders.18 The trouble with this argument
is that there is a well known reluctance amongst prosecuting authorities, especially in
Scotland, to bring prosecutions relating to consumer offences and even if that does
happen there is no mechanism for ensuring that the victim can intervene to request
17 The Impact Assessment at para 1.107 speculates that there might be 100-500 small claims
each year as a result of the proposed reforms. It is available online at http://www.justice.gov.
uk/lawcommission/docs/cp199_consumer_redress_impact_assessment.pdf.
18 Law Commissions, Consumer Redress (n 1) para 14.8
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that an order be made.19 Given that many of these claims will result from breaches of
the regulations affecting numerous consumers incurring small losses what is needed
is a multi-party action procedure in the Scottish legal system as recommended
by the Scottish Law Commission20 and endorsed by the Scottish Civil Courts
Review.21
Cowan Ervine
University of Dundee
EdinLR Vol 15 pp 452-456
Positive Prescription of Corporeal Moveables?
The Scottish Law Commission has revisited the question of the positive
prescription of moveable property1 some thirty-five years after its 1976 Consultative
Memorandum2 concerned with the same issue. Earlier, the Commission report3
which led to the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 had ruled out
proposals concerning positive prescription of moveables “until we had considered
problems of title to corporeal moveables more generally”. No final report followed
the 1976 paper, and there has been no judicial development or clarification of the
common law. At the academic level, however, a convincing case has been made to
confirm the view that the common law sources do not provide for positive prescription
applying to corporeal moveables.4
In its Discussion Paper, the Commission points out that the absence of law on
positive prescription of moveables leaves a gap. At the same time, it is acknowledged
that provision on this is much less important applied to corporeal moveable property
than to land – this, of course, being true even post registration of title. Also, as the
discussion paper acknowledges, the subject under consideration does not rate in
importance compared to that matter of everyday incidence, the negative prescription
of obligations.
19 In 2009/10 only 173 prosecutions under the regulations were brought in the whole of the UK: Office of
Fair Trading, Positive Influence: Annual Report and Resource Accounts 2009-10 (2010) annex G, table
G-7.
20 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Multi-Party Actions (Scot Law Com No 154, 1996).
21 Report of the Scottish Civil Courts Review (2009) vol 2 para 13.64.
1 Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper on Prescription and Title to Moveable Property (Scot Law
Com No 144, 2010).
2 Scottish Law Commission, Consultative Memorandum on Corporeal Moveables: Usucapion or
Acquisitive Prescription (Scot Law Com CM No 30, 1976).
3 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Reform of the Law Relating to Prescription and Limitation of
Actions (Scot Law Com No 15, 1970) para 3.
4 A R C Simpson, “Positive prescription of moveables in Scots law” (2009) 13 EdinLR 445.
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A. THE CURRENT LAW
As the law stands, the only prescription applicable to corporeal moveables is the
negative form provided for in section 8 of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland)
Act 1973. This provides that a right relating to property, heritable or moveable, which
has subsisted for a continuous period of twenty years unexercised or unenforced, and
without any relevant claim having been made, is extinguished on expiration of the
period. An important limitation is that the right to recover stolen property from the
thief or “any person privy to the stealing” is imprescriptible.5
An unresolved issue concerns the consequence of section 8 operating to bar the
owner’s right to recover. The Commission’s answer is “that the common law gives
ownership to the Crown”, that owned property “cannot cease to be owned” and
that “[i]f no one else owns. . . the Crown does: quod nullius est fit domini Regis.”6
The implication is that the possessor who successfully invokes negative prescription
under section 8 immediately becomes vulnerable to the Crown. But how can this be
reconciled with the presumption that the possessor of a moveable is its owner? The
SLC acknowledges that “[t]he fact of possession raises a presumption of ownership”7
but, of course, that does not detract from the fundamental point that ownership and
possession are distinct and the former may trump the latter. That the SLC take this
to be the position appears from the final list of “proposals and questions”; on the
question whether “the ownership of corporeal moveable property should, like land,
cease to be subject to negative prescription” it is stated that “[a]t present, the sole
beneficiary of negative prescription of title to moveables is the Crown”.8 Perhaps
this important issue of the scope of the quod nullius doctrine can be explored by
example.
In 1988 P bought from a reputable Edinburgh antique dealer a pair of 17th century
French chairs. In 2011 D, claiming that the chairs were stolen from him, seeks to
recover them. In principle D can rebut the presumption protecting P’s possession by
proving his title and showing – by reference to the theft – that he did not part with
possession in circumstances consistent with a transfer of ownership. But, because
more than twenty years have passed since D’s loss of possession, P can rely on section
8 of the 1973 Act unless D can show that he (P) was privy to the theft. If P’s purchase
is found to have been in good faith decree will be against D with the consequence
that P will be entitled to continue in possession.
The Commission envisage a possible scenario in which the Crown now asserts
a title to the chairs. Acknowledging that “in practice the Crown would not assert
its right” the view is nonetheless taken that “it is better if the law can give a
sensible result, rather than giving an unsensible result with the hope that people
will sensibly ignore that result”.9 But is the Commission correct in the view that in
theory the Crown could claim a thing from the possessor upon the true owner’s right
5 Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 Sch 3 para (g).
6 Scottish Law Commission, Prescription and Title to Moveable Property (n 1) para 2.6
7 Para 2.1.
8 Part 12, s 17.
9 Para 2.7.
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to recover being extinguished by negative prescription? An alternative view is that
the Crown would not be able to rebut the presumption –which continues to protect
the possessor – because while it could establish title it would not be able to show
that it lost possession in circumstances inconsistent with transfer – for the obvious
reason that it never had possession. If a claim by the Crown is denied on the basis
contended for it seems that negative prescription functions with the presumption that
the possessor is owner to give a result equivalent to one which would be achieved by
positive prescription.
B. COMPARATIVE LAW
A comparative survey in part 5 of the Discussion Paper demonstrates the considerable
variation in the period of possession required by different systems – three years in
France, thirty in South Africa being the apparent outer limits. But prescriptive period
is not the full story in all systems because some protect the bona fide purchase of a
moveable to the extent that the circumstances of an apparently legitimate market
transaction may give an unimpeachable title.
This feature of Italian law was strikingly illustrated in the English Winkworth
decision.10 In this case an owner’s right to recover stolen artworks – removed from
England; sold to a bona fide buyer in Italy; returned to England for auction –was
denied because, on the basis of the lex situs rule of private international law, Italian
law giving title to a bona fide purchaser was held to apply. The rationalisation that
commercial policy should allow acquisition of goods purchased by an honest party
in normal market circumstances may be associated with the inarticulate thinking of
the maxim mobilia non habent sequelam and the more specific defence of market
overt. Scots law, of course, has never subscribed to a market overt exception to the
prerequisite that the seller has a good title to transfer. Section 22(2) of the Sale of
Goods Act 1979 exempted Scotland from the section 22(1) provision recognising
market overt but the latter was repealed in 1994 after its use to launder the defective
title to Gainsborough and Reynolds paintings stolen from Lincoln’s Inn.11 The
common law vitium reale goes far in Scots law to protect an owner against possible
loss of title following theft – the presumption that the possessor is owner is open to
rebuttal by an owner deprived by theft. The owner’s right to recover is only lost by
negative prescription after twenty years and only against a party innocent as to the
theft.
C. CULTURAL OBJECTS AND TREASURE
Possibly the most important area of potential application of a rule providing for
the positive prescription of corporeal moveables is in relation to “cultural objects”,
specially considered in part 4 of the Discussion Paper. In the most usual forms of
consumer corporeal moveable property the significance of possible title issues decline
10 [1980] Ch 496.
11 See F M B Reynolds “Abolition of market overt” (1995) 111 LQR 76.
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as a matter of direct correlation to depreciation. Recognition of this is one justification
for the good faith purchase position of some systems. But this approach is hard
to justify in respect of the loss of an appreciating thing, typically a work of art or
object of cultural property. A powerful international trend to recognise and protect
inherent rights, whether associated with title lost through wrongful dispossession or
objects associated with cultural identity removed from their native environment, has
produced a significant growth of international and domestic legal regulation. As the
Discussion Paper observes, “cultural property law”, with criminal and export control
implications, is a much wider subject than the positive prescription of moveables
in Scottish private law issue.12 Nonetheless, the question remains as to whether
reform should make separate provision for “cultural objects”, however defined. The
DCFR does this in its provision for acquisitive prescription; in respect of property
defined in the EU Directive on the Return of Cultural Objects Unlawfully Removed
from the Territory of a Member State13 the DCFR would apply extended periods
of thirty and fifty years depending upon whether the possession was in good faith
or not.14
The prevailing common law position of Scots law vests a find of “treasure” or an
object of archaeological or historical importance in the Crown on the basis of the all
encompassing quod nullius rule, already referred to, in terms of which all forms of
previously owned property which come to be unowned belong to the Crown. The
practical benefits of this rule are that lost things can be restored to their rightful
owner and unowned treasures or antiquities can be applied to the public benefit,
including museum display. It may be inconvenient for public authority to have to
deal with the vast range of useless and unwanted things which consumer society
leaves in its wake but this would, in any event, be the ultimate responsibility of state
authority.
Specifically regarding treasure or antiquities, the distinctive quod nullius rule
serves the important purpose of securing for the nation things which should neither
be open to individual acquisition by finding nor susceptible to ready positive
prescription. The question “[s]hould corporeal property that is abandoned become
ownerless, and thus susceptible to appropriation under the doctrine of occupatio”15
should be rejected for tending towards “finders keepers” thinking – foreign to Scots
law –which puts individual entitlement above that of society as a whole.16 In the
situation of retention by a finder two points of present law are relevant. The Crown
as title holder can readily rebut the presumption protecting possession because its
right to possession was denied by the taking finder – such circumstances obviously
being inconsistent with transfer. Also, negative prescription will only bar a claim by
the Crown in favour of one innocent as to the object’s provenance.
12 Scottish Law Commission, Prescription and Title to Moveable Property (n 1) para 4.3.
13 Council Directive 93/7/EEC of 15 Mar 1993, OJ 1993 L 74/74, art 1(1).
14 DCFR VIII-4:102.
15 Scottish Law Commission, Prescription and Title to Moveable Property (n 1) para 9.7 and Part 12, s 21.
16 A recent case in point, reported in The Times, 8 Jun 2011, is the pre-Ice Age axehead found by a man
walking on the beach at St Ola, Orkney.
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D. CONCLUSION
On the central issue of the case for positive prescription, the Discussion Paper
refers to four arguments:17 the fairness of long possession giving protection against
dispossession; the certainty deriving from an acknowledgement that possession has
given rise to title; the fact that the positive prescription of moveables is recognised in
most legal systems; and the argument that positive prescription protects sellers as well
as buyers because it functions to indemnify the former against defective title claims by
the latter. The paper’s general conclusion is that “there should be positive (acquisitive)
prescription for corporeal moveable property” because “if right and possession are
separated. . . for that separation to exist without limit of time is unacceptable”.18 The
Commission’s view is that “the period should be at least fifteen years”.19
This note can only touch on a few aspects of a most thorough and well presented
discussion paper. On a utilitarian basis one might question the case for a law reform
project regarding an area of provision which, while possibly idiosyncratic, is essentially
unproblematic and, moreover, appears to serve the important area of cultural
property rather well. But, from the point of view of enhanced dogmatic integrity, the
discussion paper is a welcome step. In admirably covering the ground preliminary
to possible reforming legislation the paper undoubtedly advances appreciation of
the workings of an area of private law dominated by historical evolution rather
than policy. Taken with the relevant part of the important DCFR work published
in 2010 –much referred to in the Discussion Paper –we have a valuable body of
analysis and evaluation on all aspects of the positive prescription of moveables
question. An ancillary benefit is that this combination of research work takes
forward the contribution of the 1976 discussion paper in a valuable way for teaching
purposes.
David Carey Miller
University of Aberdeen
(The author is grateful to Andrew Simpson for comments on a draft of this note.)
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The Importance of the New JP Court
A. A QUESTION
Lay courts in Scotland – originally Burgh, Police and JP Courts, but combined into
District Courts in the 1970s – have been Cinderellas of the legal system, and seen as
being of little interest. This is understandable, for their nature was always disparate
17 Scottish Law Commission, Prescription and Title to Moveable Property (n 1) para 6.10.
18 Para 6.19.
19 Para 7.14.
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(being administered by local authorities), and their jurisdiction limited to minor crime
(at least in modern times).
But their status changed recently. The Criminal Proceedings etc. (Reform)
(Scotland) Act 2007 transformed District Courts into the new JP Courts as part of
“summary justice reform” following the McInnes Report.1 Thus, the lay courts have
been incorporated into a unified hierarchy of courts, and selection and training of
lay justices improved. These reforms sought greater community involvement in the
administration of justice, but also intended that the space created by greater use of
alternatives to prosecution allow lay courts take more serious cases, cascading down
from sheriff summary courts (and so on, up the hierarchy). So how important are they
now?
B. QUANTITY
One measure of importance is the proportion of criminal proceedings they take,
clearly significant in itself, but also interesting as the McInnes Committee majority
view was that District Courts should be abolished, in part, because they were in
decline.2
McInnes, using the standard criterion of “Persons proceeded against in court”,
concluded that lay District Court “business [had] approximately halved”3 over the
preceding decade.4 Only raw numbers were given, but these indicated a decline
which can be calculated as from 43% of “persons proceeded against in court” in 1992
to 27% in 2002 (in fact nearer one third than one half).5 This decline was “largely as
a result of the expansion of alternatives to prosecution” such as fiscal fines,6 but also
because total recorded crime decreased by 25% from 1991 to 2002.7
So has the decline continued since McInnes, a decade in which “summary justice
reform” introduced numerous changes, including enhancement of “alternatives to
prosecution”, as well as replacement of District Courts by JP Courts? The answer
is difficult to pin down. The standard source, the Scottish Government’s annual
Statistical Bulletin “Criminal Proceedings in Scottish Courts”,8 gives a figure for
1 Summary Justice Review Committee, Report to Ministers (2004), available at http://www.scotland.
gov.uk/Publications/2004/03/19042/34176.
2 Para 7.72(i). The 2007 Act reflected the Executive’s preference for the minority view.
3 That is: from 84,705 out of 198,038 cases to an estimated 37,000 out of 138,000. Stipendiary magistrates’
business had dropped from about 6% to about 4.5%.
4 Summary Justice Review Committee, Report (n 1) para 4.27 and table in para 4.28 (sourced from the
unpublished Scottish Executive Justice Department court proceedings database).
5 D Oag, G Ross and F McCallum, The Scottish Criminal Justice System: The Criminal Courts (SPICe
Subject Map, Devolved Area 01/08, 2003) 4, recording that in 2001, of persons proceeded against, 29%
were before District Courts (excluding a further 4% before stipendiary magistrates).
6 Summary Justice Review Committee, Report (n 1) paras 4.27 and 7.19.
7 Ibid para 7.19.
8 The most recent is Scottish Government, Criminal Proceedings in Scottish Courts 2009-10 (2011),
available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Resource/Doc/338582/0111403.pdf.
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“Persons proceeded against in court”,9 but it is not broken down by type of court.
A surrogate, “Persons with a charge proved” is, however,10 and indicates that the
proportion of case taken by District/JP Courts did not decline over this period, but
bumped along on a plateau at 36-37% for most of it,11 suddenly increasing in 2009-10
to 42% (a rise of over 10% in a year).
This gives distinctly higher proportions than the McInnes Report found for the
whole decade that it considered.12 Moreover, the raw numbers given are higher,13
which is clearly odd, because the number of “Persons with a charge proved” cannot
be higher than “Persons proceeded against in court”. However, with different sets
of figures, produced by different people, for different purposes and by different
means,14 differences might be expected. (To exemplify, McInnes disaggregated
Stipendiary Magistrates’ figures from District Courts figures, while the Statistical
Bulletin aggregates them).15 So corroboration of the post-McInnes pattern which the
Statistical Bulletin reveals would be welcome.
Such corroboration is provided by Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service
“Case Processing – the last five years” data.16 This records cases “processed” by
Crown Office, so the figures are not directly comparable with either McInnes’ or the
Statistical Bulletin’s. (Also, the raw numbers are lower than the Statistical Bulletin’s,
possibly because stipendiary magistrates’ are aggregated with sheriff summary
courts).17 Nevertheless, for the five years covered, they confirm the Statistical Bulletin
pattern of a plateau, though calculated (as only raw numbers are given)18 at between
31% and 33%, ending with a rise in 2009-10, calculated at 36%19 (a rise of about
10%). Thus, although the precise level is unclear, the pattern seems likely to reflect
reality. The decline that McInnes predicted has not occurred.
This is presumably because of the interaction of two Crown Office policies in
the light of the various aspects of “summary justice reform”: that is, the use of
9 Ibid table 1, final row. See also table 2.
10 Ibid table 3 (for definitions of “person. . . proceeded against or convicted” and “person with a charge
proved”, see annex C para C1(a)).
11 But 34% in 2003-2004.
12 e.g. Scottish Government, Criminal Proceedings 2009-10 (n 8) table 3 gives 38% for 2001-02,
whereas Summary Justice Review Committee, Report (n 1) paras 4.27-4.28 gives a number calculated
above at 27% for 2002 (see text accompaying n 5). For Statistical Bulletin figures for the whole
McInnes decade, see Scottish Government,Criminal Proceedings in Scottish Courts, 2002 (CrJ/2004/1,
2004) table 2, which shows much smaller decline than the McInnes report. (Note that para 23
corrects figures published in 2001 which included 1992, and were somewhat closer to the McInnes
report.)
13 43,939 for 2001-02, compared with McInnes’ estimated 37,000 for 2002.
14 See Scottish Government, Criminal Proceedings 2009-10 (n 8) annexes A-D, especially annex A
para A1.
15 See Scottish Government, Criminal Proceedings 2009-10 (n 8) table 3 n 5.
16 Available at http://www.crownoffice.gov.uk/About/corporate-info/Caseproclast5.
17 Ibid n 4.
18 Between 38,973 “total District Court disposals” out of 296,874 “total court disposals” in 2006-2007, and
40,746 out of 123,919 in 2005-2006 (and similarly in 2008-2009).
19 42,196 “total District Court disposals” out of 116,047 “total court disposals” in 2009-2010.
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“alternatives to prosecution”, and on which court to prosecute in. On the former,
there is published information, for instance, in both Statistical Bulletin20 and “Case
processing” data,21 recording differences in the use of warnings, “fixed penalty”
notices, “fiscal fines” and so on over the last few years. These present a complicated
picture impossible to further examine here, though (as McInnes noted)22 increased
use of “direct measures” obviously tends to reduce the JP Court proportion of cases,
by taking minor cases away from the courts entirely.23 On the latter, there is little or no
published information. However, it can be inferred to have increased the proportion
by broadly the same amount, by diverting cases otherwise taken by sheriff summary
courts.
Though only a bold person would predict future proportions, it seems clear that
at present, JP Courts take about a third of all criminal proceedings in courts, and this
proportion may be rising.
Incidentally, since solemn procedure takes only 4% of all cases,24 and some of
those are disposed of by pleas of guilty,25 this third is much higher than the proportion
of all cases in which a jury is in fact involved. Ceteris paribus, the chances of a person
charged with an offence actually being brought before a lay court approach ten times
those of actually being brought before a jury.
C. QUALITY
This introduces another principal measure of importance, i.e. the seriousness of the
crime they take. This is again significant in itself, but also in the light of the fact that
JP Courts were expected to take more serious cases.
Clearly, the crime is all minor, but, without wishing to minimise its importance,
most crime is relatively minor. The Statistical Bulletin includes a table of “Persons
with a charge proved by main crime/offence”. This shows that, in 2009-10, there were
2,453 convictions for the most frequent types of major crime, i.e. “Non-sexual crimes
of violence”,26 including all types of homicide (115);27 serious assault and attempted
murder (1,501); robbery (533); and others, including threats, extortion and cruel and
20 Scottish Government, Criminal Proceedings 2009-10 (n 8) tables 21-29.
21 “Non-Court Disposals”.
22 Summary Justice Review Committee, Report (n 1) para 7.19 (also paras 7.42-7.47 and 7.72(i)).
23 Non-court disposals now exceed court disposals: see R M White, “Out of court and out of sight: how
often are ‘alternatives to prosecution’ used?” (2008) 12 EdinLR 481.
24 Scottish Government, Criminal Proceedings 2009-10 (n 8) table 3 shows that 1% of “persons with a
charge proved” appeared before the High Court, and 3% before sheriff solemn courts.
25 Proportions of guilty pleas are not recorded, but Scottish Government, Criminal Proceedings 2009-10
(n 8) table 2 gives frequencies of desertions and acquittals by type of case, suggesting the percentage
of cases proved decreases with seriousness.
26 Ibid table 4(a).
27 Annex D.
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unnatural treatment of children (304).28 But examination of some relatively minor
crimes shows that the number of convictions for acts of vandalism (3,629) was one
and a half times greater than all the “Non-sexual crimes of violence” put together; the
number for shoplifting (8,076) was some three times greater; and the numbers for
breach of the peace (14,051), “petty or minor assault” (14,107) and speeding (14,375)
were each nearly six times greater.29 Relatively minor crime is much more common
than major crime.
This conclusion is reinforced by penalty data. The Statistical Bulletin records
that 87% of all court disposals were non-custodial in 2009-10, a proportion steady
for at least a decade.30 Indeed, at 13%, the proportion of custodial sentences
in 2009-10 was the same as the proportions of each of probation orders, and
of cautions or admonitions in that year, both of which rose steadily over the
preceding decade, from 10% to 13% (a rise of about a third), and from 11% to
14% (a rise of similar magnitude), respectively.31 Courts admonish as often as they
imprison.
Fines are, of course, the most common penalty. These amounted to 59% of all
disposals in 2009-10, a decline over the preceding decade from 65%32 (thus balancing
out the increased proportions of probation and admonition, though the Statistical
Bulletin attributed the decline, in part, to increased use of non-court disposals).33
More surprisingly, the level of fines does not appear in general to be high, for the
average imposed on individuals (as opposed to companies) by all courts was £217 in
2009-10.34 This is less than a tenth of the £2,500 maximum fine the JP Court can
currently impose.35
Unfortunately, however, the Statistical Bulletin does not break disposal figures
down by court, so it is impossible to tell what proportion of custodial sentences,
what level of fines, etc, were imposed by JP Courts. In any case, these proportions
will doubtless change in the future, given increased use of non-court disposals,36
reform of “community penalties”37 and restrictions upon short sentences38 (which all
also assume that most crime is relatively minor), and possible increases in JP Court
sentencing powers.39
28 Annex D.
29 Table 4(a).
30 Table 7, second table.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Para 5.5.14.
34 Para 5.5.16.
35 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 s 7(6)(b) and (7)(b) read with s 225(2). (The maximum
sentence of imprisonment is 60 days: s 7(6)(a) and (7)(a)).
36 ss 302, 302A, 302B, 302C, 302ZA and 302ZB. For discussion, see R MWhite, “The Summary Criminal
Proceedings (Abolition) (Scotland) Act 2007?” 2008 JR 215.
37 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 ss 227A-227ZN.
38 s 204(3A).
39 Criminal Proceedings etc. (Reform) (Scotland) Act 2007 s 46 (not yet in force) allows increases to fine
and imprisonment maxima to be made, within certain limits, by statutory instrument.
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D. CONCLUSION
Evidence of quantity and quality of cases in the new JP Courts indicate that they take
about a third of all criminal proceedings, a proportion which may be rising, and is not
an insignificant appendix to “real crime”, but the typical stuff of the criminal courts.
They are important and may be increasingly so.
Robin M White
University of Dundee
(The author wishes to thank Pamela Ferguson, Johan Findlay, Gillian Mawdsley and
Colin Reid for helpful comments on drafts.)
